A suite, hey I guess that’s where Apple got the idea for OSX!

I don’t get it.

Annnnnnyway, suites were on the Mac and IIgs in the 80’s. There was GSWorks, AppleWorks (ClarisWorks), etc.

Of course, Word, Excel, PowerPoint were developed on the Mac before Windows. That’s why the copyright info on the Mac Word says “1983-2004”.

Microsoft Office 1.0 for the Mac shipped in 1990.

The first version for Windows shipped as Microsoft Office 3 because the Mac version was at version 3 (the same crap they did with NT), in 1992.

Are you still smug?

You have yet to give me any examples at all of Microsoft amazing marketing that created this monopoly and you ignore all of the facts that have come out of the two DoJ cases against Microsoft.

You aren’t giving facts at all.  Office was specifically cleared from most, in not all, the “evil” stuff the DOJ said MS did.  Again, that’s why Microsoft wasn’t split up.  It would just have created two companies each one with a monopoly on operating systems and the other with a monopoly on Office suites.  Why because MS Office’s dominance wasn’t dependent upon Windows (or any other Microsoft product) in any way.  Remember, Office had a monopoly (or the majority marketshare) on the Mac long before it had similar marketshare on Windows.

I already said the Windows 95 campaign was the only one I can remember.

Secondly, I’m not talking about consumer marketing but the marketing Microsoft did to business.  So no, there were any popular slogans streaming across the TV or newspaper.  People wanted Windows (and Office) because that’s what they used at work.

Thrice, Microsoft television ads to consumers didn’t start until 1992.  Windows 3.0 was released well before that and Microsoft was already the largest software maker in the world.  They moved into that position by marketing to developers, business, and large OEM’s.

But your premise is that OS/2 would have a monopoly and not Windows simply if IBM had Microsoft’s marketing. This, of course, is a joke.

Had IBM not been so fickle with their sales teams it might have not died when it did.  Even IBM perfered to use MS-DOS and Windows on their (internal) PC’s as opposed to PC-DOS and OS/2.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OS/2

You can read all about why OS/2 failed on wikipedia.  Not the least of which is how much IBM charged for their development kits.

Yeah, you guys were really pissed Jobs said 2007. He was right.

No he wasn’t right.  At the time the timeline was not “2007” in any way shape or form.  He made that up, period.  He did it to make it seem like Longhorn/Vista was on a schedule (approx.) the same as Leopard.  It wasn’t.  That was an attempt at deception so as to not make himself and his product look bad.  That’s called a lie.  It’s intent to deceive (note: whether or not something is true doesn’t make it a lie… something that is true can be a lie as well.  Although what Jobs said still wasn’t true.)

If Jobs simply would have stated it as opinion it wouldn’t have been a lie.  But it was not fact even though he presented it as fact.

Further example: What if Vista slips into mid-2007 or 2008?  “late 2006/early 2007” would be wrong once again and it still wouldn’t change whether or not Jobs’ statement was a lie or not.  It was a lie because he made it up and presented it as fact to make himself look better.

Yeah, you were wrong on that too when you blamed Apple for IBM’s technical issue. I gave you a link that quoted an IBM executive that proved you were wrong on that.

What link?  I never blamed Apple for IBM having heat issues.  I blamed Apple for putting in larger orders to get IBM to devote more of their factories to making G5’s.  Irregardless of what the yield on the processors were, getting more of IBM’s factories devoted to making G5’s would result in more G5’s.  That’s why Microsoft’s large orders of processors got filled much quicker than Apple’s far smaller orders.
Again, for your enjoyment:
http://arstechnica.com/articles/columns/mac /mac-20050710.ars
Note: The Xbox 360 chip has heat problems as well, which is why it also uses liquid cooling.

I was not wrong but you were wrong in your “speculation” about Xbox 360 problems?

Why is it that you have to act like such a… everytime your faced with confronting something you were wrong about?  Can’t you just say, “I was wrong” and leave it at that instead of:

“It was just speculation… but you were wrong about (insert_compeletely_irrelevant_topic_here).”

I shouldn’t even have brought up the Xbox 360 stuff because all it made me do is sink to your level.

How so? If 9% of all PCs have the SP2 update and 24% of XP PCs have the update, that means it’s around 40%. Correct my math.

Easy.  At no point in your quote does it say “9% of all PC’s”.
It says, “The survey of 136,000 PCs at 251 companies in North America found that Windows XP SP2 had been deployed on only about 9% of those computers. ”

And that’s just the beginning.

But I thought it was the marketing?

Marketing of the SUITE and it’s superiority (which is supposedly what all marketing does).  I didn’t say nor imply that they were marketing an inferior product.

No, you don’t have a clue. The first case against them established that Microsoft couldn’t withhold Windows from PC manufacturers if they bundled competing products. The second case established that the pricing had to be the same for all PC manufacturers.

None of that says anything about Office.  The products in question were the ones required to be bundled with Windows:
IE, WMP, Outlook Express, and MSN.  Office was never one of those products.  Buying Office with Windows was ALWAYS OPTIONAL.
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f3800/msjudg ex.htm
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200400/2004 57.htm
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-948381.html

There is nothing about Office anywhere in the DOJ ruling.

Microsoft used this tactic against QuickTime and AOL too.
Quicktime refers to the WMP/DX thing (I mentioned) and AOL refers to MSN.

Office was specifically cleared from most, in not all, the “evilâ€? stuff the DOJ said MS did. 

First, that makes no sense. Office isn’t a company. How can it be “cleared”.

Second, it is a fact that the first anti-trust action against Microsoft resulted in Microsoft not being able to force PC vendors to not bundle competing products. Microsoft was doing that for Windows, and for Office. If a PC vendor wanted Windows 3 and wanted to bundle WordPerfect for Windows with it, Microsoft said that they wouldn’t sell Windows to them. The second anti-trust action against Microsoft resulted from Microsoft ignoring the first anti-trust’s judgement and tried to fix this by forcing Microsoft to charge the same amount of money for Windows OEM to PC vendors. Microsoft was giving rebates to PC vendors who did not bundle competing products, including products that competed with Office. This is all fact.

Again, that’s why Microsoft wasn’t split up. 

No, that isn’t why Microsoft wasn’t split up. That was the sentencing, Kuaidang. Microsoft was found guilty by the DoJ. You are ignoring that part. And a big part of that case was Internet Explorer but also included Microsoft’s unfair business tactics in regards to their Windows pricing. Your logic is seriously flawed. With your logic, if someone who was found guilty of a crime wasn’t sentenced to jail time, they didn’t actually do anything wrong.

Why because MS Office’s dominance wasn’t dependent upon Windows

It was because of their marketing. LOL!

Remember, Office had a monopoly (or the majority marketshare) on the Mac long before it had similar marketshare on Windows.

Office came out in 1990. Word and Excel were one of the very first applications for the Mac, developed in 1983. There wasn’t any competition for business software like this for the Mac until a few years later, with spreadsheets like Wingz. And Microsoft bought competing software like FoxBase.

Ami Pro and Wingz did really well on Windows in the early 90’s, before Office came out in 1992 for Windows. Ami was the firs word processor for Windows, coming out a year before Word.

Secondly, I’m not talking about consumer marketing but the marketing Microsoft did to business

Yes, you were. You are now backtracking because you are losing this debate.

There’s nothing Apple can do to truely combat Microsoft’s Vista and Office 2007 marketing.... it’ll be on the front page of every Best Buy, Circuit City, and CompUSA ad, it’ll be all over every newspaper in the country (not just the WSJ, and paper in NY and SF), it’ll be at Walmart, Target, K-Mart and everywhere else.  Intel will be promoting it, AMD will be promoting it as will every PC manufacturer in the world.  Jay Leno will make jokes about it and no one will care about how late it is, how long it took to develop, or where the features appeared first…

Windows 95 was the “most Mac-like” experience on a PC and Microsoft had Office for Windows 95 out of the gate and pressured PC vendors to bundle it.

People wanted Windows (and Office) because that’s what they used at work.

People wanted Windows because they all had PCs at work and they wanted a GUI and WYSIWYG without having to replace all their office PCs with Macs.

Remember, Office didn’t come out until 1992. It wasn’t an instant monopoly. There was a much better word processor in Ami Pro. There was a much better spreadsheet in Wingz. There was a much, much, much better slide application in Aldus Persuasion (I know from personal experience and I was using this stuff back then).

The computer came with Office (and still does).

Windows 3.0 was released well before that and Microsoft was already the largest software maker in the world.

Not from marketing.

You can read all about why OS/2 failed on wikipedia.  Not the least of which is how much IBM charged for their development kits.

None of that is marketing. There were technical reasons. Also, Microsoft penalized vendors if they wanted to offer OS/2. This was established in the first anti-trust case against them.

No he wasn’t right.  At the time the timeline was not “2007â€? in any way shape or form

Where did he claim that was Microsoft’s timeline? He didn’t.

It was a lie because he made it up and presented it as fact to make himself look better.

No, it was his opinion, and he was right.

What link?  I never blamed Apple for IBM having heat issues.

Sigh. I gave you the link several times because you keep pretending you don’t know what I’m talking about.

It wasn’t about heat issues. It was about yield issues.

You claimed it was Apple’s fault that they didn’t get enough PowerPC chips from IBM. Apple blamed IBM and you gave me some anti-Apple blog that said it was Apple’s fault that IBM couldn’t get them enough chips.

Here’s the link. Bookmark it:
http://www.eetimes.com/news/semi/showArticl e.jhtml;jsessionid=MZBCB15O1E5Q4QSNDBOCKH0CJUMEK JVN?articleID=20300687

The chip unit continues to wrestle with its chip yields, but claims it is close to resolving these nagging issues. Last month, IBM disclosed it lost $150 million within its struggling semiconductor unit alone, due to ongoing chip yield issues and a drop in intellectual-property (IP) revenues. One of the problems is ongoing yield issues within its 300-mm fab in East Fishkill, N.Y. (see April 15 27 story).

For example, Apple Computer Inc. has recently complained that it is unable to obtain enough processors from its foundry partner--IBM--reportedly due to yields, according to analysts. IBM is currently making several processors for Apple, including the G5, a 90-nm design for 64-bit computing applications.

IBM’s chip yields “are not quite where we would like them to be,” said John Kelly III, senior vice president and group executive of IBM’s Systems and Technology Group. “Lately, our defect densities have improved quite rapidly. We expect to do a better job to meet the demand of our customers,” he said during a conference call on Wednesday (May 12).

I was not wrong but you were wrong in your “speculation� about Xbox 360 problems?

Go back to that thread and read the part where I said I was mostly joking. The argument wasn’t about whether or not the Xbox shortage was because of the PPC because we had no proof at all.

The argument was about whether or not Apple’s shortage was because of IBM. My point was that Apple had an issue with IBM’s yield and I wondered if Microsoft’s issue was with IBM’s yield. You said that IBM didn’t have any yield issues and it was Apple’s fault.

I never said with confidence that it was definitely IBM’s fault. You pointed out that it could be a memory chip or some other chip. I laughed at the notion that it was the other chip (controller chip?).

Easy.  At no point in your quote does it say “9% of all PC’sâ€?.
It says, “The survey of 136,000 PCs at 251 companies in North America found that Windows XP SP2 had been deployed on only about 9% of those computers.

Ah, so that has nothing to do with my math. You are nitpicking and arguing semantics now. I love how you completely dismiss any survey that goes against your agenda.

A survey of iPod owners showing a halo effect? You dismiss it.

Marketing of the SUITE and it’s superiority

LOL! Office was never ever ever superior to the competitors. To this day, PowerPoint sucks total ass. Persuasion 3 from a decade ago is still better in many regards. Wingz is still better in many regards. Ami Pro is still better in many regards.

The products in question were the ones required to be bundled with Windows:

Because the issue isn’t what was bundled with Windows. The issue is the pricing schemes Microsoft used with Windows and those prices were different based on whether or not the PC vendor bundled competing software through rebates.

There is nothing about Office anywhere in the DOJ ruling.

LOL!!! Read your own link (the first one).

From your own link:

64.  An aspect of Microsoft’s pricing behavior that, while not tending to prove monopoly power, is consistent with it is the fact that the firm charges different OEMs different prices for Windows, depending on the degree to which the individual OEMs comply with Microsoft’s wishes. Among the five largest OEMs, Gateway and IBM, which in various ways have resisted Microsoft’s efforts to enlist them in its efforts to preserve the applications barrier to entry, pay higher prices than Compaq, Dell, and Hewlett-Packard, which have pursued less contentious relationships with Microsoft.

IBM
115.  IBM is both a hardware and a software company. On the hardware side, IBM manufactures and licenses, among other things, Intel-compatible PCs. On the software side, IBM develops and sells, among other things, Intel-compatible PC operating systems and office productivity applications. The IBM PC Company relies heavily on Microsoft’s cooperation to make a profit, for few consumers would buy IBM PC systems if those systems did not work well with Windows and, further, if they did not come with Windows included. IBM’s software division, on the other hand, competes directly with Microsoft in other respects. For instance, IBM has in the past marketed OS/2 as an alternative to Windows, and it currently markets the SmartSuite bundle of office productivity applications as an alternative to Microsoft’s Office suite. The fact that IBM’s software division markets products that compete directly with Microsoft’s most profitable products has frustrated the efforts of the IBM PC Company to maintain a cooperative relationship with the firm that controls the product (Windows) without which the PC Company cannot survive.

116.  Whereas Microsoft tried to convince Netscape to move its business in a direction that would not facilitate the emergence of products that would compete with Windows, Microsoft tried to convince IBM to move its business away from products that themselves competed directly with Windows and Office. Microsoft leveraged the fact that the PC Company needed to license Windows at a competitive price and on a timely basis, and the fact that the company needed Microsoft’s support in many more subtle ways. When IBM refused to abate the promotion of those of its own products that competed with Windows and Office, Microsoft punished the IBM PC Company with higher prices, a late license for Windows 95, and the withholding of technical and marketing support.

117.  In the summer of 1994, the IBM PC Company told Microsoft that, with respect to licensing Microsoft’s operating-system products, it wanted to be quoted terms just as favorable as those extended to IBM’s competitor, Compaq. It was IBM’s belief that Compaq paid the lowest rate in the industry for Windows and enjoyed unparalleled marketing and technical support from Microsoft. In response to the IBM PC Company’s request, Microsoft proposed that the companies enter into a “Frontline Partnership” similar to the one that existed between Microsoft and Compaq. Pursuant to that proposal, Microsoft and the IBM PC Company would perform joint sales, marketing, and development work, and the PC Company would receive future Microsoft products at the lowest rates in the industry.

118.  At the same time that it offered the IBM PC Company the rather general terms in the Frontline Partnership Agreement, Microsoft also offered the PC Company specific reductions in the royalty rate for Windows 95 if the company would focus its marketing and distribution efforts on Microsoft’s new operating system. Specifically, the PC Company would receive an $8 reduction in the per-copy royalty for Windows 95 if it mentioned no other operating systems in advertisements for IBM PCs, adopted Windows 95 as the standard operating system for its employees, and ensured that it was shipping Windows 95 pre-installed on at least fifty percent of its PCs two months after the release of Windows 95. Given the volume of IBM’s PC shipments, the discount would have amounted to savings of between $40 million and $48 million in one year. Of course, accepting the terms would have required IBM, as a practical matter, to abandon its own operating system, OS/2. After all, IBM would have had difficulty convincing customers to adopt its own OS/2 if the company itself had used Microsoft’s Windows 95 and had featured that product to the exclusion of OS/2 in IBM PC advertisements.

119.  Representatives from IBM and Microsoft, including Bill Gates, met to discuss the relationship between their companies at an industry conference in November 1994. At that meeting, IBM informed Microsoft that, rather than enter into the Frontline Partnership with Microsoft, IBM was going to pursue an initiative it called “IBM First.” Consistent with the title of the initiative, IBM would aggressively promote IBM’s software products, would not promote any Microsoft products, and would pre-install OS/2 Warp on all of its PCs, including those on which it would also pre-install Windows. IBM thus rejected the terms that would have resulted in an $8 reduction in the per-copy royalty price of Windows 95.

120.  True to its word, IBM began vigorous promotion of its software products. This effort included an advertising campaign, starting in late 1994, that extolled OS/2 Warp and disparaged Windows. IBM’s drive to best Microsoft in the PC software venue intensified in June 1995, when IBM reached an agreement with the Lotus Development Corporation for the acquisition of that company. As a consequence of the acquisition, IBM took ownership of the Lotus groupware product, Lotus Notes, and the Lotus SmartSuite bundle of office productivity applications. Microsoft had already identified Notes as a middleware threat, because it presented users with a common interface, and ISVs with a common set of APIs, across multiple platforms. For its part, SmartSuite competed directly with Microsoft Office. In mid-July 1995, IBM announced that it was going to make SmartSuite its primary desktop software offering in the United States.

121.  Microsoft did not intend to capitulate. In July, Gates called an executive at the IBM PC Company to berate him about IBM’s public statements denigrating Windows. Just a few days later, Microsoft began to retaliate in earnest against the IBM PC Company.

122.  The IBM PC Company had begun negotiations with Microsoft for a Windows 95 license in late March 1995. For the first two months, the negotiations had progressed smoothly and at an expected pace. After IBM announced its intention to acquire Lotus, though, the Microsoft negotiators began canceling meetings with their IBM counterparts, failing to return telephone calls, and delaying the return of marked-up license drafts that they received from IBM. Then, on July 20, 1995, just three days after IBM announced its intention to pre-install SmartSuite on its PCs, a Microsoft executive informed his counterpart at the IBM PC Company that Microsoft was terminating further negotiations with IBM for a license to Windows 95. Microsoft also refused to release to the PC Company the Windows 95 “golden master” code. The PC Company needed the code for its product planning and development, and IBM executives knew that Microsoft had released it to IBM’s OEM competitors on July 17. Microsoft’s purported reason for halting the negotiations was that it wanted first to resolve an ongoing audit of IBM’s past royalty payments to Microsoft for several different operating systems.

123.  Prior to the call on July 20, neither company’s management had ever linked the ongoing audit to IBM’s negotiations for a license to Windows 95. IBM was dismayed by the abrupt halt in the license negotiations and the prospect that it might not get a license for Windows 95 until the audit process concluded. IBM’s executives executives surmised that all of its major competitors had already signed licenses for Windows 95. The PC Company would lose a great deal of business to those competitors during the crucial back-to-school season if it could not begin pre-installing Windows 95 on its PCs immediately. The conclusion of the audit appeared to be weeks, if not months, away. The PC Company thus faced the prospect of missing the holiday selling season as well. IBM executives pleaded with Microsoft to uncouple the license negotiations from the ongoing audit and offered Microsoft a $10 million bond that Microsoft could use to indemnify itself against any discrepancies that the audit might ultimately reveal. IBM also offered to add a term to any Windows 95 license agreement whereby IBM would pay penalties and interest if any future audit disclosed under-reporting of royalties by IBM.

124.  On August 9, 1995, a senior executive at the IBM PC Company went to Redmond to meet with Joachim Kempin, the Microsoft executive in charge of the firm’s sales to OEMs. At the meeting, Kempin offered to accept a single, lump-sum payment from IBM that would close all outstanding audits. The amount of this payment would be reduced if IBM offered a concession that Kempin could take back to Gates. As one possibility, Kempin suggested that IBM agree to not bundle SmartSuite with its PCs for a period of six months to one year. He explained that the prospect of IBM bundling SmartSuite with its PCs threatened the profit margins that Microsoft derived from Office and constituted a core issue in the relationship between the two companies. The IBM executive rejected Kempin’s suggestion. In a follow-up letter, Kempin stated that Microsoft would require approximately $25 million from IBM in order to settle all outstanding audits. Kempin reiterated that,

If you believe that the amount I am asking for is too much, I would be willing to trade certain relationship improving measures for the settlement charges and/or convert some of the amounts into marketing funds if IBM too agrees to promote Microsoft’s software products together with their hardware offerings.

The message was clear: IBM could resolve the impasse ostensibly blocking the issuance of a Windows 95 license — the royalties audit — by de-emphasizing those products of its own that competed with Microsoft and instead promoting Microsoft’s products.

125.  IBM never agreed to renounce SmartSuite or to increase its support for Microsoft software, and in the end, Microsoft did not grant IBM a license to pre-install Windows 95 until fifteen minutes before the start of Microsoft’s official launch event on August 24, 1995. That same day, the firms brought the audit issue to a close with a settlement agreement under which IBM ultimately paid Microsoft $31 million. The release of Windows 95 had been postponed more than once, and many consumers apparently had been postponing buying PC systems until the new operating system arrived. The pent-up demand caused an initial surge in the sales of PCs loaded with Windows 95. IBM’s OEM competitors reaped the fruits of this surge, but because of the delay in obtaining a license, the IBM PC Company did not. The PC Company also missed the back-to-school market. These lost opportunities cost IBM substantial revenue.

126.  Even once the companies had resolved the audit dispute, Microsoft continued to treat the IBM PC Company less favorably than it did the other major OEMs, and Microsoft executives continued to tell PC Company executives that the treatment would improve only if IBM refrained from competing with Microsoft’s software offerings. On January 5, 1996, Kempin sent a letter to a counterpart at the IBM PC Company. In it, Kempin expressed his belief that the PC Company would enjoy a closer, more cooperative relationship with Microsoft if only IBM’s software arm did not compete as aggressively with the products that comprised the core of Microsoft’s business:

As long as IBM is working first on their competitive offerings and prefers to fiercely compete with us in critical areas, we should just be honest with each other and admit that such priorities will not lead to a most exciting relationship and might not even make IBM feel good when selling solutions based on Microsoft products. . . .You are a valued OEM customer of Microsoft, with whom we will cooperate as much as your self-imposed restraints allow us to do. Please understand that this is neither my choice or preferred way of doing business with an important company like IBM. In addition, we would like to see the IBM PC company being more actively involved in assisting Microsoft to bring key products to market . . . . To date the IBM PC company has not always been an active participant in these areas - understandable given your own internal product priorities. I hope you can help me to change this.

In closing, Kempin wrote, “You get measured in selling more hardware and I firmly believe if you had less conflict with IBM’s software directions you actually could sell more of it.”

127.  When Kempin spoke to the same executive at the end of the month, he repeated a message he had delivered more than once before: The fact that the IBM PC Company pre- installed SmartSuite on its PC systems made Microsoft reluctant to help IBM sell more PC systems. After all, the more PC systems IBM sold with SmartSuite, the fewer copies of Office Microsoft could sell. For this reason, as Kempin explained to a group of IBM PC Company representatives in August 1996, Microsoft refused to provide IBM press releases with quotes endorsing any PC system that IBM shipped with SmartSuite. Microsoft later expanded that rule to cover any IBM PCs shipped with the World Book electronic encyclopedia instead of Microsoft’s Encarta. IBM might have been less concerned about Microsoft’s refusal to offer endorsements if such quotes did not appear frequently and prominently in press releases announcing new PC systems from other OEMs such as Compaq. Microsoft’s conspicuous silence with respect to IBM PCs sent the message to customers that IBM’s PCs did not support Windows as well as PCs manufactured by other OEMs did.

128.  Microsoft also denied the IBM PC Company access to the so-called “enabling programs” that Microsoft ran for the benefit of OEMs such as Compaq, Hewlett-Packard, and DEC, even though IBM met the prescribed objective criteria for admission. Like the absence of public endorsements, IBM’s exclusion from Microsoft’s enabling programs led customers to question whether the Microsoft software they needed would work optimally with IBM’s PCs. IBM learned through surveys it conducted that the firm had lost between seven and ten large accounts, representing about $180 million in revenue for IBM, because the tension between Microsoft and IBM led customers to doubt that Windows would not work as well with IBM PCs as with PCs produced by firms with which Microsoft was on cordial terms. Microsoft justified its exclusion of the PC Company from the enabling programs with its suspicion that IBM might use the programs to gain entrée with customers and then attempt to sell those customers IBM software instead of Microsoft products. At the same time, a Microsoft executive told a counterpart at IBM that the PC Company would be admitted to the programs when IBM’s CEO repaired his relationship with Bill Gates.

129.  Microsoft’s executives were persistent despite IBM’s repeated refusals to sacrifice its own software ambitions to improve its relations with Microsoft. In February 1997, one executive from Microsoft told a group of IBM PC Company executives that Gates might relent in his reluctance to cooperate with their company if IBM moderated its support for Notes and SmartSuite. In a meeting held the next month, Microsoft representatives conditioned fulfillment of two objects of IBM’s desires on the company’s willingness to pre-install Microsoft’s products in the place of competing applications, such as SmartSuite, and objectionable middleware, such as Notes. The first inducement that the Microsoft representatives blandished before the PC Company was early access to Windows source code, which Compaq and a handful of other OEMs enjoyed. IBM wanted this early access in order to ensure its hardware’s contemporaneous compatibility with Microsoft’s operating system products. Next, Microsoft offered IBM permission to certify itself as being compliant with certain hardware requirements that Microsoft imposed (and that customers had come to look for as a sign of an OEM’s ability to support Windows). Self-certification would have decreased the time it took IBM PCs to reach the market, and IBM knew that the privilege was already being extended to some of its main OEM competitors. With respect to both benefits, the representatives from Microsoft explained that Microsoft would extend them to the PC Company on the condition that it stop loading its PC systems with software that threatened Microsoft’s interests.

130.  The discriminatory treatment that the IBM PC Company received from Microsoft on account of the “software directions” of its parent company also manifested itself in the royalty price that IBM paid for Windows. In the latter half of the 1990s, IBM (along with Gateway) paid significantly more for Windows than other major OEMs (like Compaq, Dell, and Hewlett- Packard) that were more compliant with Microsoft’s wishes.

131.  Finally, Microsoft made its frustration known to IBM by reducing, from three to one, the number of Microsoft OEM account managers handling Microsoft’s operational relationship with the IBM PC Company. This reduced support impaired still further IBM’s ability to test, manufacture, and ship its PCs on schedule, further delaying IBM’s efforts to bring its PC products to market against the competition in a timely manner.

132.  In sum, from 1994 to 1997 Microsoft consistently pressured IBM to reduce its support for software products that competed with Microsoft’s offerings, and it used its monopoly power in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems to punish IBM for its refusal to cooperate. Whereas, in the case of Netscape, Microsoft tried to induce a company to move its business away from offering software that could weaken the applications barrier to entry, Microsoft’s primary concern with IBM was to reduce the firm’s support for software products that competed directly with Microsoft’s most profitable products, namely Windows and Office. That being said, it must be noted that one of the IBM products to which Microsoft objected, Notes, was like Navigator in that it exposed middleware APIs. In any event, Microsoft’s interactions with Netscape, IBM, Intel, Apple, and RealNetworks all reveal Microsoft’s business strategy of directing its monopoly power toward inducing other companies to abandon projects that threaten Microsoft and toward punishing those companies that resist.

I wish we could edit.

Microsoft was found guilty by the DoJ.

The DoJ’s case against them.